One significant limitation of this theory is that it assumes that the AI Coordination Problem will involve two key actors. Table 1. Explain Rousseau's metaphor of the 'stag hunt'. the primary actors in war, having been replaced by "group[s] identified in terms of ethnicity, religion, or tribe" and that such forces rarely fight each other in a decisive encounter. In game theory, the stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social cooperation. This is expressed in the following way: The intuition behind this is laid out in Armstrong et al.s Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial intelligence.[55] The authors suggest each actor would be incentivized to skimp on safety precautions in order to attain the transformative and powerful benefits of AI before an opponent. [11] This Article conceptualizes a stag hunt in which the participants are countries that host extractive companies on their stock exchanges, including the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, the Member States . which can be viewed through the lens of the stag hunt in for an example the countrys only international conference in International Relations from, Scenario Assurance game is a generic name for the game more commonly known as Stag Hunt. The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, presented the following Any individual move to capture a rabbit will guarantee a small meal for the defector but ensure the loss of the bigger, shared bounty. .more Dislike Share Noah Zerbe 6.48K subscribers One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. [47] look at different policy responses to arms race de-escalation and find that the model or game that underlies an arms race can affect the success of policies or strategies to mitigate or end the race. What are, according to Kenneth Waltz, the causes of war? international relations-if the people made international decisions stag hunt, chicken o International relations is a perfect example of an Last Resort, Legitimate authority, Just cause, high probablity of succession, right intention, proportionality, casualities. As will hold for the following tables, the most preferred outcome is indicated with a 4, and the least preferred outcome is indicated with a 1., Actor As preference order: DC > CC > DD > CD, Actor Bs preference order: CD > CC > DD > DC. The question becomes, why dont they always cheat? No payoffs (that satisfy the above conditions including risk dominance) can generate a mixed strategy equilibrium where Stag is played with a probability higher than one half. Let us call a stag hunt game where this condition is met a stag hunt dilemma. If they both work to drain it they will be successful, but if either fails to do his part the meadow will not be drained. In the stag hunt, what matters is trust Can actors trust that the other will follow through Depends on what they believe about each other, What actors pursue hinges on how likely the other actor is to follow through What is Game Theory theory of looking strategic interaction The game is a prototype of the social contract. [6] See infra at Section 2.2 Relevant Actors. In order to assess the likelihood of such a Coordination Regimes success, one would have to take into account the two actors expected payoffs from cooperating or defecting from the regime. Evidence from AI Experts (2017: 11-21), retrieved from http://arxiv.org/abs/1705.08807. As stated, which model (Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock, or Stag Hunt) you think accurately depicts the AI Coordination Problem (and which resulting policies should be pursued) depends on the structure of payoffs to cooperating or defecting. In the current Afghan context, the role of the U.S. military is not that of third-party peacekeeper, required to guarantee the peace in disinterested terms; it has the arguably less burdensome job of sticking around as one of several self-interested hunters, all of whom must stay in the game or risk its collapse. ? Additionally, both actors can expect a greater return if they both cooperate rather than both defect. c Here, values are measured in utility. [47] George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, & Randolph M. Siverson, Arms Races and Cooperation, World Politics, 38(1: 1985): 118146. Gardner's vision, the removal of inferior, Christina Dejong, Christopher E. Smith, George F Cole. The Stag Hunt The Stag Hunt is a story that became a game. Schelling and Halperin[44] offer a broad definition of arms control as all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.. [13] And impressive victories over humans in chess by AI programs[14] are being dwarfed by AIs ability to compete with and beat humans at exponentially more difficult strategic endeavors like the games of Go[15] and StarCraft. The corresponding payoff matrix is displayed as Table 14. [11] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier, June 2017, https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Advanced%20Electronics/Our%20Insights/How%20artificial%20intelligence%20can%20deliver%20real%20value%20to%20companies/MGI-Artificial-Intelligence-Discussion-paper.ashx: 5 (estimating major tech companies in 2016 spent $20-30 billion on AI development and acquisitions). In international relations, examples of Chicken have included the Cuban Missile Crisis and the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction in nuclear arms development. In this section, I outline my theory to better understand the dynamics of the AI Coordination Problem between two opposing international actors. For example, if the two international actors cooperate with one another, we can expect some reduction in individual payoffs if both sides agree to distribute benefits amongst each other. Depending on which model is present, we can get a better sense of the likelihood of cooperation or defection, which can in turn inform research and policy agendas to address this. David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Weiss and Agassi wrote about this argument: "This we deem somewhat incorrect since it is an oversight of the agreement that may change the mutual expectations of players that the result of the game depends on Aumanns assertion that there is no a priori reason to expect agreement to lead to cooperation requires completion; at times, but only at times, there is a posteriori reason for that How a given player will behave in a given game, thus, depends on the culture within which the game takes place".[8]. In Just War Theory, what is the doctrine of double effect? 0000009614 00000 n The payoff matrix is displayed as Table 12. Another example is the hunting practices of orcas (known as carousel feeding). The primary difference between the Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken, however, is that both actors failing to cooperate is the least desired outcome of the game. I introduce the example of the Stag Hunt Gamea short, effective, and easy-to-use activity that simulates Jean-Jacques Rousseau's political philosophy. In this section, I briefly argue that state governments are likely to eventually control the development of AI (either through direct development or intense monitoring and regulation of state-friendly companies)[29], and that the current landscape suggests two states in particular China and the United States are most likely to reach development of an advanced AI system first. Intriligator and Brito[38] argue that qualitative/technological races can lead to greater instability than quantitative races. It is also the case that some human interactions that seem like prisoner's dilemmas may in fact be stag hunts. Course blog for INFO 2040/CS 2850/Econ 2040/SOC 2090, Link: http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~bskyrms/bio/papers/StagHunt.pdf. [11] In our everyday lives, we store AI technology as voice assistants in our pockets[12] and as vehicle controllers in our garages. If they are discovered, or do not cooperate, the stag will flee, and all will go hungry. Here, I also examine the main agenda of this paper: to better understand and begin outlining strategies to maximize coordination in AI development, despite relevant actors varying and uncertain preferences for coordination. Nations are able to communicate with each other freely, something that is forbidden in the traditional PD game. In this scenario, however, both actors can also anticipate to the receive additional anticipated harm from the defector pursuing their own AI development outside of the regime. Formally, a stag hunt is a game with two pure strategy Nash equilibriaone that is risk dominant and another that is payoff dominant. While each actors greatest preference is to defect while their opponent cooperates, the prospect of both actors defecting is less desirable then both actors cooperating. xref Under the assumption that actors have a combination of both competing and common interests, those actors may cooperate when those common interests compel such action. What is the difference between 'negative' and 'positive' peace? See Carl Shulman, Arms Control and Intelligence Explosions, 7th European Conference on Computing and Philosophy, Bellaterra, Spain, July 24, 2009: 6. Before getting to the theory, I will briefly examine the literature on military technology/arms racing and cooperation. Table 4. [7] E.g. In addition to the example suggested by Rousseau, David Hume provides a series of examples that are stag hunts. Instead, each hunter should separately choose the more ambitious and far more rewarding goal of getting the stag, thereby giving up some autonomy in exchange for the other hunter's cooperation and added might. The second player, or nation in this case, has the same option. Moreover, the usefulness of this model requires accurately gauging or forecasting variables that are hard to work with. genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. International Relations Classical Realism- Morganthau- anarchy is assumed as a prominent concern in international relations,with the international Stag Hunt If the United States beats a quick path to the exits, the incentives for Afghan power brokers to go it alone and engage in predatory, even cannibalistic behavior, may prove irresistible. [19] UN News, UN artificial intelligence summit aims to tackle poverty, humanitys grand challenges, United Nations, June 7, 2017, https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/06/558962-un-artificial-intelligence-summit-aims-tackle-poverty-humanitys-grand. [25] In a particularly telling quote, Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, and Frank Wilczek foreshadow this stark risk: One can imagine such technology outsmarting financial markets, out-inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing weapons we cannot even understand. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. Each can individually choose to hunt a stag or hunt a hare. Although the development of AI at present has not yet led to a clear and convincing military arms race (although this has been suggested to be the case[43]), the elements of the arms race literature described above suggest that AIs broad and wide-encompassing capacity can lead actors to see AI development as a threatening technological shock worth responding to with reinforcements or augmentations in ones own security perhaps through bolstering ones own AI development program. publications[34] and host the worlds most prominent tech/AI companies (US: Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Tesla; China: Tencent and Baidu). The field of international relations has long focused on states as the most important actors in global politics. In the context of the AI Coordination Problem, a Stag Hunt is the most desirable outcome as mutual cooperation results in the lowest risk of racing dynamics and associated risk of developing a harmful AI. This democratic peace proposition not only challenges the validity of other political systems (i.e., fascism, communism, authoritarianism, totalitarianism), but also the prevailing realist account of international relations, which emphasises balance-of-power calculations and common strategic interests in order to explain the peace and stability that characterises relations between liberal democracies. Additionally, the defector can expect to receive the additional expected benefit of defecting and covertly pursuing AI development outside of the Coordination Regime. %PDF-1.3 % See Katja Grace, John Salvatier, Allan Dafoe, Baobao Zhang, & Owain Evans, When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? The article states that the only difference between the two scenarios is that the localized group decided to hunt hares more quickly. It is not clear whether the errors were deliberate or accidental. What are the two exceptions to the ban on the use of force in the UN Charter? Structural Conflict Prevention refers to a compromosde of long term intervention that aim to transform key socioeconomic, political and institional factors that could lead to conflict. Robert J Aumann, "Nash Equilibria are not Self-Enforcing," in Economic Decision Making: Games, Econometrics and Optimisation (Essays in Honor of Jacques Dreze), edited by J. J. Gabszewicz, J.-F. Richard, and L. Wolsey, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 1990, pp. [58] Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation, 143-144. Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world., China, Russia, soon all countries w strong computer science. As a result, this tradeoff between costs and benefits has the potential to hinder prospects for cooperation under an AI Coordination Regime. When looking at these components in detail, however, we see that the anticipated benefits and harms are linked to whether the actors cooperate or defect from an AI Coordination Regime. PRICE CODE 17. [12] Apple Inc., Siri, https://www.apple.com/ios/siri/. Back to the lionesses in Etosha National Park . [25] For more on the existential risks of Superintelligence, see Bostrom (2014) at Chapters 6 and 8. But, at various critical junctures, including the countrys highly contentious presidential elections in 2009 and 2014, rivals have ultimately opted to stick with the state rather than contest it. In each of these models, the payoffs can be most simply described as the anticipated benefit from developing AI minus the anticipated harm from developing AI. Although most authors focus on the prisoner's dilemma as the game that best represents the problem of social cooperation, some authors believe that the stag hunt represents an equally (or more) interesting context in which to study cooperation and its problems (for an overview see Skyrms 2004). For example, one prisone r may seemingly betray the other , but without losing the other's trust. Although Section 2 describes to some capacity that this might be a likely event with the U.S. and China, it is still conceivable that an additional international actor can move into the fray and complicate coordination efforts. 2 Examples of states include the United States, Germany, China, India, Bolivia, South Africa, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. In addition to the pure strategy Nash equilibria there is one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. %PDF-1.7 % and other examples to illustrate how game theory might be applied to understand the Taiwan Strait issue. Additionally, the feedback, discussion, resource recommendations, and inspiring work of friends, colleagues, and mentors in several time zones especially Amy Fan, Carrick Flynn, Will Hunt, Jade Leung, Matthijs Maas, Peter McIntyre, Professor Nuno Monteiro, Gabe Rissman, Thomas Weng, Baobao Zhang, and Remco Zwetsloot were vital to this paper and are profoundly appreciated. Individuals, factions and coalitions previously on the same pro-government side have begun to trade accusations with one another. The story is briefly told by Rousseau, in A Discourse on Inequality : If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would h ave gone off in pursuit . [4] Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford University Press, 2014). [9] That is, the extent to which competitors prioritize speed of development over safety (Bostrom 2014: 767). We see this in the media as prominent news sources with greater frequency highlight new developments and social impacts of AI with some experts heralding it as the new electricity.[10] In the business realm, investments in AI companies are soaring. @scR^}C$I3v95p6S'34Y1rar{SQ!#fzHBM6 K4m|OOpa7rB'~Y(A|'vh=ziN/quu~6,{Q One example payoff structure that results in a Chicken game is outlined in Table 11. But what is even more interesting (even despairing) is, when the situation is more localized and with a smaller network of acquainted people, most players still choose to hunt the hare as opposed to working together to hunt the stag. The game is a prototype of the social contract. Stag hunt definition: a hunt carried out to find and kill stags | Meaning, pronunciation, translations and examples One example addresses two individuals who must row a boat. This essay first appeared in the Acheson Prize 2018 Issue of the Yale Review of International Studies. An individual can get a hare by himself, but a hare is worth less than a stag. N-person stag hunt dilemmas Jorge M. Pachecol'*, Francisco C. Santos2, Max O. Souza3 and Brian Skyrms4 . As we discussed in class, the catch is that the players involved must all work together in order to successfully hunt the stag and reap the rewards once one person leaves the hunt for a hare, the stag hunt fails and those involved in it wind up with nothing. Throughout history, armed force has been a ubiquitous characteristic of the relations between independent polities, be they tribes, cities, nation-states or empires. Different social/cultural systems are prone to clash. A person's choice to bind himself to a social contract depends entirely on his beliefs whether or not the other person's or people's choice. Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. What is the so-called 'holy trinity' of peacekeeping? to Be Made in China by 2030, The New York Times, July 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/business/china-artificial-intelligence.html, [33] Kania, Beyond CFIUS: The Strategic Challenge of Chinas Rise in Artificial Intelligence., [34] McKinsey Global Institute, Artificial Intelligence: The Next Digital Frontier.. The matrix above provides one example. (1) the responsibility of the state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement; What is the difference between structural and operational conflict prevention? This subsection looks at the four predominant models that describe the situation two international actors might find themselves in when considering cooperation in developing AI, where research and development is costly and its outcome is uncertain. One final strategy that a safety-maximizing actor can employ in order to maximize chances for cooperation is to change the type of game that exists by using strategies or policies to affect the payoff variables in play. [49] For example, see Glenn H. Snyder Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics, International Studies Quarterly 15, 1(1971): 66103 and Downs et al., Arms Races and Cooperation., [50] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics., [51] Snyder, Prisoners Dilemma and Chicken Models in International Politics.. This variant of the game may end with the trust rewarded, and it may result with the trusting party alone receiving full penalty, thus, leading to a new game of revenge. [18] Deena Zaidi, The 3 most valuable applications of AI in health care, VentureBeat, April 22, 2018, https://venturebeat.com/2018/04/22/the-3-most-valuable-applications-of-ai-in-health-care/. [56] look at three different types of strategies governments can take to reduce the level of arms competition with a rival: (1) a unilateral strategy where an actors individual actions impact race dynamics (for example, by focusing on shifting to defensive weapons[57]), (2) a tacit bargaining strategy that ties defensive expenditures to those of a rival, and (3) a negotiation strategy composed of formal arms talks. [38] Michael D. Intriligator & Dagobert L. Brito, Formal Models of Arms Races, Journal of Peace Science 2, 1(1976): 7788. An hour goes by, with no sign of the stag. But, after nearly two decades of participation in the countrys fledgling democratic politics, economic reconstruction and security-sector development, many of these strongmen have grown invested in the Afghan states survival and the dividends that they hope will come with greater peace and stability. Depending on the payoff structures, we can anticipate different likelihoods of and preferences for cooperation or defection on the part of the actors. It sends a message to the countrys fractious elites that the rewards for cooperation remain far richer than those that would come from going it alone. This equilibrium depends on the payoffs, but the risk dominance condition places a bound on the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. These two concepts refer to how states will act in the international community. This additional benefit is expressed here as P_(b|A) (A)b_A. If, by contrast, each hunter patiently keeps his or her post, everyone will be rewarded with a lavish feast. Similar strategic analyses can be done on variables and variable relationships outlined in this model. Often, games with a similar structure but without a risk dominant Nash equilibrium are called assurance games. Most events in IR are not mutually beneficial, like in the Battle of the Sexes. Due to the potential global harms developing AI can cause, it would be reasonable to assume that government actors would try impose safety measures and regulations on actors developing AI, and perhaps even coordinate on an international scale to ensure that all actors developing AI might cooperate under an AI Coordination Regime[35] that sets, monitors, and enforces standards to maximize safety. [28] Once this Pandoras Box is opened, it will be difficult to close. At key moments, the cooperation among Afghan politicians has been maintained with a persuasive nudge from U.S. diplomats. The prototypical example of a PGG is captured by the so-called NPD. This table contains an ordinal representation of a payoff matrix for a Chicken game. Both nations can benefit by working together and signing the agreement. If both choose to leave the hedge it will grow tall and bushy but neither will be wasting money on the services of a gardener. Hume's second example involves two neighbors wishing to drain a meadow. One hunter can catch a hare alone with less effort and less time, but it is worth far less than a stag and has much less meat. In the US, the military and intelligence communities have a long-standing history of supporting transformative technological advancements such as nuclear weapons, aerospace technology, cyber technology and the Internet, and biotechnology. It is his argument: "The information that such an agreement conveys is not that the players will keep it (since it is not binding), but that each wants the other to keep it." 1. [50] This is visually represented in Table 3 with each actors preference order explicitly outlined. Since the payoff of hunting the stags is higher, these interactions lead to an environment in which the Stag Hunters prosper. hunting stag is successful only if both hunters hunt stag, while each hunter can catch a less valuable hare on his own. Therefore, an agreement to play (c,c) conveys no information about what the players will do, and cannot be considered self-enforcing." This distribution variable is expressed in the model as d, where differing effects of distribution are expressed for Actors A and B as dA and dB respectively.[54]. If, by contrast, the prospect of a return to anarchy looms, trust erodes and short-sighted self-interest wins the day. [26] Stephen Hawking, Stuart Russell, Max Tegmark, Frank Wilczek, Transcendence looks at the implications of artificial intelligence but are we taking AI seriously enough? The Indepndent, May 1, 2014, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/stephen-hawking-transcendence-looks-at-the-implications-of-artificial-intelligence-but-are-we-taking-9313474.html. To be sustained, a regime of racial oppression requires cooperation. 7into the two-person Stag Hunt: This is an exact version of the8 informal arguments of Hume and Hobbes. The payoff matrix would need adjusting if players who defect against cooperators might be punished for their defection. Additional readings provide insight on arms characteristics that impact race dynamics. The stag hunt problem originated with philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality. Those who play it safe will choose 0000003265 00000 n Stag Hunt is a game in which the players must cooperate in order to hunt larger game, and with higher participation, they are able to get a better dinner. Jean-Jacques Rousseau described a situation in which two individuals go out on a hunt. Other names for it or its variants include "assurance game", "coordination game", and "trust dilemma". Finally, there are a plethora of other assuredly relevant factors that this theory does not account for or fully consider such as multiple iterations of game playing, degrees of perfect information, or how other diplomacy-affecting spheres (economic policy, ideology, political institutional setup, etc.) [21] Jackie Snow, Algorithms are making American inequality worse, MIT Technology Review, January 26, 2018, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610026/algorithms-are-making-american-inequality-worse/; The Boston Consulting Group & Sutton Trust, The State of Social mobility in the UK, July 2017, https://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/BCGSocial-Mobility-report-full-version_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf. Using game theory as a way of modelingstrategicallymotivated decisions has direct implications for understanding basic international relations issues.
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